

RESULTS OF CONSULTATION

Market participants had an opportunity to respond to the intended changes in the Policy Rule on Fitness 2012 between 15 July and 15 September 2022. DNB and the AFM received eight consultation responses. This feedback statement is a concise, point-by-point presentation of the key points of the responses together with comments from DNB and the AFM on these responses.

| # | Subject | Explanatory notes | DNB/AFM comments | Changes |
|---|----------------------|-------------------------------|--|---------|
| 1 | Make the changes for | The Federation of the Dutch | The changes are shown in the track changes document on | No. |
| | pension funds more | Pension Funds requests a | which the Federation of the Dutch Pension Funds was able to | |
| | explicit. | more explicit account of the | provide input. The application of the Policy Rule to pension | |
| | | changes for pension funds, | funds is contextualised in the preamble and has not been | |
| | | making it clear not only that | changed. | |
| | | pension funds must comply | | |
| | | with the new Policy Rule, but | The Policy Rule applies to enterprises as defined in point 1.1 | |
| | | – much more importantly – | of the Policy Rule. The Policy Rule provides a cross-sectoral | |
| | | also what the reasons for and | framework for assessing suitability. The supervisors thus | |

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| objectives of the changes are. ensure a transparent and equal assessment p | oolicy. At the |
| Also, due to the specificsame time, the Policy Rule provides proportion | onal scope to |
| nature of pension funds, the address sector-specific discrepancies. For sec | ctor-specific |
| Federation of the Dutchimplementation, additional explanatory notes | s are provided |
| Pension Funds believes it where relevant, including on the websites of I | DNB (Open Book |
| would be better if the Policy on Supervision) and the AFM. For the pension | n sector, see, for |
| Rule included more example, the more detailed guidance with reg | gard to <u>key</u> |
| customisation. <u>function holders</u> (in Dutch).The supervisors t | thus aim to take |
| account of the specific nature of the pension s | sector. |
| 2 More detailed The Federation of the Dutch The 'Management, organisation and commun | nication' area is Yes. |
| explanation of the Pension Funds believes the being tightened up in line with the capacity for | or change that is |
| changes to suitability addition of the requirement of nowadays required of policymakers – partly i | in view of the |
| areas and competences. 'sight and control of long- challenges of climate change and sustainability | ity. DNB and the |
| term value creation' to the AFM have provided clarification by means of | the addition, as |
| suitability area of they now state explicitly that long-term value | e creation is a |
| management, organisation precondition for bearing effective ultimate re | esponsibility as a |
| and communication (part director. A policymaker is expected to have si | ight of what is |
| 1.2(1)(A)) should not be part needed in order to add value and to be able to | o take steps to |

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| of this suitability area. The | achieve it here and now (not merely have a vision of it). |
| supervisors are requested to | Society will also devote increasing attention to the |
| clarify what long-term value | importance of long-term value creation. This is also reflected |
| creation this refers to and | in the Corporate Governance Code, which was recently |
| whether this requirement | updated. ¹ This aspect is therefore referred to specifically in |
| also applies to pension funds, | part A of the Policy Rule. |
| are already focused on the long term. A more detailed explanation, clearly indicating added and changed competences, especially for pension funds, would also be desirable. | The competences listed in the annex to the Policy Rule are neither exhaustive nor cumulative. Each competence can apply to any policymaker, depending on the position, collective and type, and the size and risk profile of the enterprise. This is not intended to be a substantive change but a clarification. The AFM and DNB are happy to accept some of the suggestions made and make adjustments to the competencies. |
| | The competences have been reviewed and, where necessary, |

¹ <u>Corporate Governance Code 2022 | Code | Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee (mccg.nl)</u>



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| | | | tightened up, updated, added or deleted. For example, to | | |
| | | | better reflect the current social context, some definitions have | | |
| | | | been changed and some competences have been explicitly | | |
| | | | cited in the annex. Efforts have been made to provide clarity | | |
| | | | with regard to socially relevant competences and their | | |
| | | | definitions. Alignment was also sought with existing | | |
| | | | standards on competences (in Europe and elsewhere). | | |
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| 3 Give a cleare | er | The Federation of the Dutch | On 6 July 2020, the AFM and DNB sent a <u>letter</u> (in Dutch) to | No. | |
| explanation | of the | Pension Funds and Van | the Minister of Finance with regard to the Ronnes motion on | | |
| notion of rea | asonable | Hasselt Law request a clearer reassessment. It describes the structure of the reassessment | | | |
| cause. | | explanation of the notion of | process. | | |
| | | reasonable cause. | When examining whether there is 'reasonable cause' for | | |
| | | They draw attention to the | reassessment, the supervisor considers various factors. These | | |
| | framework conditions in the EBA/ESMA Guidelines. They | include the nature and state of the changed facts and | | | |
| | | circumstances. If there is a supervisory antecedent, its | | | |
| | | seriousness is taken into account. The facts and | | | |
| | | also call for a focus on | circumstances are explained in more detail in the explanatory | | |



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| | | securing fundamental rights | notes to the Policy Rule. Fundamental rights and other | |
| | | and guarantees. | relevant safeguards and conditions are taken into account | |
| | | | when examining the 'reasonable cause' – and when | |
| | | | conducting an assessment or reassessment. | |
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| 4 | Assessment process and | Van Hasselt Law requests | Not all of Van Hasselt Law's suggestions and questions relate | No. |
| | procedures of the AFM | greater clarity on the | directly to the evaluation of the Policy Rule. | |
| | and DNB. | assessment process and the procedures of the AFM/DNB. Specifically, the questions are as follows: • What lead times should an institution/candidate expect? • What information is included in the file compiled for the | The underlying relevant laws and regulations, referred to in the preamble, set the statutory time limits for processing an assessment. These statutory time limits may vary. In the Policy Rule, the AFM and DNB have specified the aspects to be taken into account in a suitability assessment. Neither DNB nor the AFM are authorised to set different time limits independently. The same applies to the information to be supplied as part of an assessment; this can be found in the laws and regulations relevant to the target group. | |

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| | assessment, and how | An assessment interview is not a regular part of the | |
| | can it be inspected? | suitability assessment. An assessment interview can add to | |
| | • What are the criteria | the picture gained from the supplied file. Other information | |
| | for arranging an | on the AFM and DNB assessment process can be found on | |
| | interview as part of | DNB Open Book on Supervision and the AFM website. | |
| | the process in | | |
| | addition to the | | |
| | written documents? | | |
| | • How is the obtained | | |
| | information | | |
| | weighted? For | | |
| | example, the | | |
| | impression gained | | |
| | during an interview | | |
| | versus service | | |
| | record/references? | | |
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| 5 | Confidential adviser in | Van Hasselt Law mentions the | During the assessment process, candidates can contact two | No. | _ |
| | an assessment process | importance of the work of the | external confidential advisers appointed by DNB and the | | |
| | and the DNB-AFM | confidential adviser (and | AFM. The AFM and DNB provide information about this on | | |
| | cooperation panel. | awareness of this work) and | their websites (<u>DNB link</u> , in Dutch) (<u>AFM link</u> , in Dutch). | | |
| | | the evaluation of the DNB and | Candidates invited for an assessment interview also receive | | |
| | | AFM cooperation panel. | individually tailored information. The external confidential | | |
| | | | advisers report their findings to the DNB Executive Board and | | |
| | | | the AFM Executive Board every year. | | |
| | | | Part 1.8 of the Policy Rule refers to the cooperation between | | |
| | | | the AFM and DNB and establishes the panel consultation that | | |
| | | | is intended to achieve consistent application of the Policy | | |
| | | | Rule. The findings of the joint panel have been used in this | | |
| | | | evaluation of the Policy Rule. In addition to this feedback | | |
| | | | statement, a summary of the evaluation of the cooperation in | | |
| | | | the panel consultation has been published, providing | | |
| | | | feedback on the number and type of cases in which the AFM | | |



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| | | | and DNB have worked intensively together over the past two | |
| | | | years. | |
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| 6 | Consistent approach in | Van Hasselt Law stresses the | The Policy Rule is intended to explain the aspects that the | No. |
| | the assessment process | importance of a consistent | AFM and DNB take into account when assessing suitability | |
| | between DNB and the | approach in the assessment | and ensure that they are applied consistently. Partly in | |
| | AFM. | process between DNB and the | response to the recommendations of the external Ottow | |
| | | AFM. According to Van | evaluation committee (December 2016), the AFM and DNB | |
| | | Hasselt Law, an external | have endeavoured to make the working processes involved in | |
| | | evaluation such as that | an assessment as consistent and recognisable as possible. The | |
| | | previously conducted by the | supervisors provide transparent information on the | |
| | | Ottow committee, involving | assessment process and the required preparation on the | |
| | | discussions with multiple | website (<u>DNB website</u> , <u>AFM website</u> , in Dutch). In terms of | |
| | | stakeholders, could provide | content, the AFM and DNB adhere to the legal bases (and the | |
| | | valuable insights to refine the | corresponding statutory limits for lead times) as stated in the | |
| | | policy pursued by the AFM | various national and European laws (see preamble to the | |
| | | and DNB and take | Policy Rule) and to the frameworks set out in the Policy Rule. | |
| | | appropriate control measures | | |
| | | | | |



| | | to promote a consistent | | |
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| | | approach. | | |
| 7 | Expertise and | Van Hasselt Law stresses the | The AFM and DNB endorse this importance and ensure that | No. |
| | experience of | importance of expertise and | their staff have sufficient knowledge and experience to carry | |
| | supervisors. | experience in the conduct of | out the work within their remit. | |
| | | assessments. | | |
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| 8 | Consistent information | Van Hasselt Law draws | The provision of information on both websites is regularly | No. |
| | provision by DNB and | attention to the need for | reviewed and checked for consistency. For example, the DNB | |
| | the AFM. | consistency in the | Open Book on Supervision website shows when there is a co- | |
| | | information provided on the | policymaker (see inter alia <u>Assessments – what and why</u> | |
| | | AFM and DNB websites. For | (dnb.nl) and Assessment of management board members, co- | |
| | | example, only the FAQ on the | policymakers, supervisory board members and holders of a | |
| | | AFM's site currently refer to | qualifying holding for crypto service providers (dnb.nl)). | |
| | | the existence of a co- | | |
| | | policymaker. | | |
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| 9 | Compliance with the | Van Hasselt Law notes that | The <i>WWft</i> does indeed provide a means of making directors | Yes. |
| | Anti-Money Laundering | the increased focus on <i>WWft</i> | aware of their responsibility with regard to integrity rules | |

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| | and Anti-Terrorist | compliance and the impact on | (including de-risking and risks involved in sharing customer | |
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| | Financing Act (<i>WWft</i>). | society is a useful means of | data). Directors must demonstrate their fitness to provide | |
| | | making directors (and | sound and ethical operational management, including careful | |
| | | prospective directors) more | treatment of customers, risk management and compliance | |
| | | aware of their collective and | with laws and regulations. | |
| | | individual responsibility to | The AFM and DNB have also further explained in the | |
| | | counter excesses that have a | explanatory notes to the Policy Rule that under the <i>WWft</i> , | |
| | | social impact in the form of | within the collective of day-to-day (and other) policymakers, | |
| | | de-risking and unrestrained | a policymaker is responsible for complying with the | |
| | | sharing of customer data. | requirements arising from the WWft. | |
| 10 | Personal data | Van Hasselt Law comments | The AFM and DNB are happy to note this comment. | No. |
| | protection. | that it is important not to lose | | |
| | | sight of the fundamental right | | |
| | | to protection of personal data. | | |
| 11 | 11 Make diversity a more Montae & Partners believes The AFM and DNB encourage diversity in the collective | | The AFM and DNB encourage diversity in the collective. | No. |
| | integral part of the | that the Policy Rule put out to | Diversity ensures a broad view and different perspectives. | |
| | assessment framework. | essment framework. consultation should devote The explanatory notes to the Policy Rule therefore devote a | | |
| | | more attention to diversity, in | lot of attention to diversity in the collective. Diversity in this | |

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| | | line with the current spirit of | regard goes beyond gender. Differences in knowledge, | |
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| | | the times and the | experience, age and professional and geographic background | |
| | | observations of the | can also contribute positively to the governance of an | |
| | monitoring committee. This | | enterprise as a whole. The supervisor therefore explicitly | |
| | | applies in any event at the | takes these diversity elements into account in its assessment | |
| | | level of collective expertise. | process. The explanatory notes have also been updated to | |
| | | | take account of recent developments in laws and regulations | |
| | | | on diversity. | |
| 12 | Include members of | Montae & Partners calls for | The variables are always considered in an assessment: the | No. |
| | stakeholder bodies and | consideration of the way in | nature, role and function and the size and risk profile of the | |
| | governance models. | which the supervisor assesses | enterprise are taken into account as well as composition and | |
| | | the suitability requirements | functioning of the collective. With regard to the time | |
| | | for members of a stakeholder | commitment, as assessment is made of the prospective role | |
| | body. This could include | | and this is taken into account in the judgement. The candidate | |
| | | clarification of the way in | must have sufficient time for the intended role. Members of a | |
| | | which the required time | stakeholder body and liquidators are both subject to the | |
| | | commitment is assessed for | requirements set out in the Policy Rule, and the specific | |
| | | such co-policymakers, partly | features of the role are taken into account in the suitability | |

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| because they do not fall ass | sessment, part of which concerns the time commitment |
| within the scope of Article (pa | art E). The Policy Rule thus provides for the requested |
| 35a of the Decree dis | stinction between the different models. |
| implementing the Pensions | |
| Act and the Mandatory | |
| Occupational Pension Scheme | |
| Act. The same could be | |
| considered in the case of | |
| liquidators, although that is | |
| by definition a temporary | |
| role. In this regard, Montae & | |
| Partners requests that a | |
| distinction be drawn between | |
| directors in a parity model | |
| and executive and non- | |
| executive directors in other | |
| models. | |
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| 13 | Make change | Montae & Partners asks | The competences listed in the annex to the Policy Rule are | No. |
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| | management a more | whether, given the major | neither exhaustive nor cumulative. The 'adaptability' | |
| integral part of the | | changes that lie ahead for the | competence refers to the policymaker's handling of | |
| assessment framework. sec | | sector, it would not be better | significant and far-reaching processes that lie ahead in one | |
| | | to focus more prominently on | specific sector, or in general. The supervisors believe this is | |
| | | change management or | sufficient to ensure that attention is devoted to the ability to | |
| | | ʻadaptability'. | deal with changes, such as the new Pensions Act. | |
| | | | The addition of ensuring 'long-term value creation' in part A of the Policy Rule also contributes to this. | |
| 14 | Scope of the Policy Rule. | The Dutch Banking | The ECB directly supervises Dutch significant banks and has | No. |
| | | Association asks why, in the | exclusive competence to take the decisions based on the | |
| | | proposed amendment to the | assessments. In conducting the assessments, the ECB applies | |
| | Policy Rule, the supervisors | | relevant Union law as implemented in national legislation. | |
| | | stated that the ECB is 'in | However, the ECB is not unconditionally bound by the Policy | |
| | | principle' not bound by the | Rule on Fitness; after all, a governing body can only adopt | |
| | | Policy Rule? What is the effect | Policy Rules within its own powers, and the Policy Rules are | |
| | | of this addition of 'in | only binding on the governing body that drew them up. When | |



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| | | principle'? Which specific | the assessment competence was transferred to the ECB, the | |
| | | parts of the national Policy | corresponding policy space went with it. If the ECB policy had | |
| | | Rule is the ECB actually | deviated significantly from the policy conducted in the | |
| | | bound by, and under what | Netherlands up until that time, a transition period might be | |
| | | circumstances? | appropriate, for reasons of legal certainty, for example. | |
| | | | However, this is not the case at present. | |
| 15 | Certified mutual | The Dutch Association of | It is true that there are no longer any 'certified mutual | Yes. |
| | insurance societies. | Insurers points out that | insurance societies' operating in the Netherlands. These went | |
| | | 'certified mutual insurance | on to operate as SII, SII-basic or exempt insurers with the | |
| | | societies' disappeared from | introduction of Solvency II. DNB has accepted the suggestion | |
| | the Dutch financial sector | | and removed 'certified mutual insurance society' from the | |
| | | 1 January 2016. | amended Policy Rule. | |
| 16 | Sufficiently | The Association of | Partly as a result of this consultation response, the AFM and | Yes. |
| | independent members | Proprietary Traders | DNB have concluded that the implementation of the amended | |
| | in the management | comments that an amended | EBA/ESMA Guidelines on the assessment of the suitability of | |
| | body in its supervisory | internal reference (in part | members of the management body and key function holders | |
| | function. | 2.2.1.5, the reference to 2.4.1 | of banks and investment firms was incomplete. Since it has | |
| | | has been changed to 2.2.1.1) | already been explicitly stated in the explanatory notes that | |

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| | | makes it look as though it is a | the AFM and DNB apply the EBA/ESMA Guidelines on the | |
| | | requirement to have already | assessment of the suitability of members of the management | |
| | | worked for a listed company | body and key function holders of banks and investment firms | |
| | | or investment firm before | when conducting assessments, the fifth paragraph of this | |
| | | being eligible for appointment | article is redundant. This article has therefore been deleted. | |
| | | as a member of the | | |
| | | supervisory body of a listed | | |
| | | investment firm, and it states | | |
| | | that it does not believe this | | |
| | | necessary or desirable. | | |
| 17 | Knowledge of ICT risk | The Association of | We previously thought it would be useful to indicate in | Yes. |
| | management. | Proprietary Traders | advance what the implications of DORA would be for the | |
| | | comments that the | suitability requirements once DORA becomes applicable. | |
| | | explanatory notes on the | Partly as a result of this consultation response, the AFM and | |
| | | detailed requirements | DNB have come to the view that it is preferable not to refer to | |
| | | imposed on the management | DORA yet until the rules are in force. | |
| | | bodies of enterprises under | DNB and the AFM have therefore decided to remove the | |
| | | DORA make it seem as if | references to DORA from the Policy Rule and the explanatory | |

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| | | every member of the board of | notes. Knowledge of ICT risk management among | | | |
| | | a financial enterprise covered | policymakers is nevertheless increasingly essential. For that | | | |
| | | by DORA must be an ICT | reason, risk control and mitigation in the field of ICT (and ICT | | | |
| | | expert. It believes that this is | outsourcing) are indeed mentioned as relevant subjects | | | |
| | | disproportionate and detracts | under knowledge of sound and ethical operational | | | |
| | | from the principle of a | rom the principle of a management. Advisers and brokers (including reinsurance | | | |
| | | collegiate board where | brokers) are not assessed for their knowledge of sound and | | | |
| | | different areas of expertise | ferent areas of expertise ethical operational management, but they may fall within the | | | |
| | | come together. APT suggests | me together. APT suggests scope of DORA. If an adviser or broker (including a | | | |
| | | making it explicit that there | | | | |
| | | must be sufficient relevant | be a reasonable cause for the AFM to assess suitability by | | | |
| | | knowledge and experience in | reference to the requirements of part 1.2.1. | | | |
| | | the collective with regard to | | | | |
| | | ICT risk management. | | | | |
| 8 | Demonstrating | Adfiz states its opposition to | The knowledge gained from relevant higher vocational (HBO | Yes. | | |
| | suitability with a | the change whereby a | or HBO+) programmes assumes a minimum level of | | | |
| | | policymaker no longer meets | knowledge and intellectual ability but usually barely covers | | | |
| | | the suitability requirement if | the practice of financial services. The additional requirement | | | |
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| aco in financial corrigos as well | ag the higher | | |

| relevant higher | they have a higher vocational | of work experience in financial services as well as the higher | |
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| vocational certificate. | certificate from an | vocational (HBO or HBO+) certificate, combined with | |
| | educational programme | acquired knowledge, thus ensures important competences, | |
| | relevant to the enterprise. | skills and professional conduct relevant to the independent | |
| | | management of a financial enterprise. The AFM and DNB do | |
| | | not wish to disproportionately limit the inflow of new | |
| | | independent advisers and have therefore decided not to | |
| | | remove the ability to demonstrate suitability by means of a | |
| | | relevant higher vocational (HBO or HBO+) certificate, but to | |
| | | leave it in place on condition that, in addition to the relevant | |
| | | higher vocational (HBO or HBO+) certificate, one year of | |
| | | relevant work experience has been acquired in the past 10 | |
| | | years. Such work experience may also have been acquired | |
| | | during studies on an internship at a relevant company (such | |
| | | as a financial service provider). | |



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| 19 | Deviation from terms | An anonymous respondent | That is correct. The AFM and DNB do not deviate from legal | No. |
| | originating in general | considers that terms used in a | provisions, but sometimes use generic terms in the Policy | |
| | legal provisions. | Policy Rule must not deviate | Rule for ease of understanding or readability. | |
| | | from terms used in a general | | |
| | | legal provision implemented | | |
| | | inter alia by the Policy Rule. | | |
| 20 | Change the definition of | An anonymous respondent | The definition of collective has been supplemented so that it | No. |
| | 'collective'. | states they do not fully | matches the relevant legal provisions. These legal provisions | |
| | | understand the change in the | almost always refer to day-to-day policymakers and members | |
| | | definition of 'collective'. | of the supervisory body. This is not a new requirement, but a | |
| | | | clarification. | |
| 21 | Introduction of new | An anonymous respondent | The inclusion of a definition of competences in the Policy Rule | No. |
| | term 'competences'. | comments that a new term | establishes a link between the content of the Policy Rule and | |
| | | 'competences' has been | the competences in the annex. Competences are skills, | |
| | | introduced in part 1:1 and | qualities and attitudinal aspects. Suitability consists of | |
| | | that this appears to overlap | knowledge, skills and professional conduct and is evidenced | |
| | | with the existing concept of | by education, work experience and competences. Therefore, a | |
| | | suitability in part 1.2. | policymaker needs more than skills alone to demonstrate | |

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| | | | suitability. It is a combination of knowledge, skills and | |
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| | | | professional conduct. Suitability is demonstrated by | |
| | | | education, work experience and competences. | |
| 22 | Alignment with | An anonymous respondent | The content of the suitability matrix depends on the group | No. |
| | suitability matrix. | comments that the | into which the enterprise falls. Enterprises in group A | |
| | | breakdown in part 1.2 does | complete a different suitability matrix than enterprises in | |
| | | not seem to match the | groups B and C. The suitability matrices reflect what the | |
| | | suitability matrix in the | enterprise is required to demonstrate in the initial | |
| | | annexes. | assessment. For example, the suitability matrix for an | |
| | | | investment firm includes a question on managerial and | |
| | | | hierarchical leadership experience, general and specific | |
| | | | professional knowledge and suitability with regard to sound | |
| | | | and ethical operational management, plus independence and | |
| | | | sufficient time (if applicable). | |
| | | | The breakdown in part 1.2 is requested in the suitability | |
| | | | matrix for enterprises in group A and if there is reasonable | |
| | | | cause to assess the policymaker by reference to the | |
| | | | requirements of part 1.2.1. | |

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| 22 | Assessment times. | An anonymous vosnondont | EUROSYSTEEM | Vac |
| 23 | Assessment times. | An anonymous respondent | The supervisor always assesses the suitability of a | Yes. |
| | | comments that it could be | policymaker before they take office. After the policymaker | |
| | | inferred from part 1.5(b) that | takes office, their suitability may be reassessed if there is | |
| | | it is possible to take office as a | reasonable cause. This has been clarified in part 1.5. | |
| | | policymaker and only to be | | |
| | | assessed thereafter, and | | |
| | | suggests stating more | | |
| | | explicitly that this concerns | | |
| | | new assessments (of persons | | |
| | | already assessed). | | |
| 24 | Overlap with EBA-ESMA | With regard to the | The Policy Rule on Fitness 2012 was amended on 15 January | Yes. |
| | Guidelines. | competences annex, an | 2020, partly in response to the entry into force of the | |
| | | anonymous respondent | EBA/ESMA Guidelines on the assessment of the suitability of | |
| | | comments that parts of it | members of the management body and key function holders | |
| | | appear to overlap with | of banks and investment firms. The requirements in these | |
| | | and/or deviate from Annex II | guidelines have been incorporated in the Policy Rule on | |
| | | ('skills') of the Joint ESMA and | Fitness. The relationship with the EBA-ESMA Guidelines has | |
| | | EBA Guidelines on the | been clarified in the explanatory notes to the Policy Rule. | |



| | | assessment of the suitability | | |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------------|---|-----|
| | | of members of the | | |
| | | management body and key | | |
| | | function holders, and suggests | | |
| | | that the annex be disapplied | | |
| | | for 'supervised institutions' | | |
| | | already covered by the EBA | | |
| | | Guidelines. | | |
| 2 | 5 Standards appear to | An anonymous respondent | The newly added standards all concern provisions in | No. |
| | refer to trustworthiness | comments that in the | regulations. In the cited regulations, the standards of | |
| | rather than suitability. | overview of the legal | trustworthiness and suitability are in the same articles. | |
| | | provisions containing the | Suitability is described differently in these regulations, | |
| | | suitability standards, some | namely as 'sufficiently experienced', 'possessing sufficient | |
| | | newly added standards | knowledge, skills and experience' and 'consisting of suitable | |
| | | appear to refer to | members'. | |
| | | trustworthiness rather than | | |
| | | suitability. | | |

| | | | DeNederlandscheBank | AFN |
|----|-----------------------|------------------------------|--|------|
| 26 | Unclear explanatory | An anonymous respondent | Part 1.2.1 sets out the basic standard for suitability: | No. |
| | note on group B. | considers that the | 'Suitability consists of knowledge, skills and professional | |
| | | explanatory note in the grid | conduct. A policymaker's suitability should at least be clear | |
| | | on group B is unclear. | from their education, experience, competences and ongoing | |
| | | | professional conduct.' In the case of group B, this standard is | |
| | | | met when the policymaker takes office by demonstrating that | |
| | | | the policymakers meet the requirements of sections 1 and 2 | |
| | | | of Chapter 2. Chapter 2, section 1 lists the general suitability | |
| | | | requirements upon taking office for groups B and C and | |
| | | | section 2 lists the specific suitability requirements upon | |
| | | | taking office for group B. | |
| | | | If there is reasonable cause, suitability will be assessed by | |
| | | | reference to the requirements of part 1.2.1. | |
| 27 | Knowledge of ICT risk | An anonymous respondent | Management of ICT risks is listed in the Policy Rule under the | Yes. |
| | management. | questions whether the | relevant area of 'sound and ethical operational management'. | |
| | | management body should | In the explanatory notes on this area, IT and digital resilience | |
| | | also have sufficient | have been added as part of suitability, with an explanation | |



| | | EUROSYSTEEM | | |
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| | | knowledge of ICT risk | being given of the management body's implementation of IT | |
| | | management. | risk management. | |
| | | | | |
| | | | Advisers and brokers (including reinsurance brokers) are not | |
| | | | assessed for their knowledge of sound and ethical operational | |
| | | | management, but they may fall within the scope of DORA. If | |
| | | | an adviser or broker (including a reinsurance broker) falls | |
| | | | within the scope of DORA, this may be a reasonable cause for | |
| | | | the AFM to assess suitability by reference to the requirements | |
| | | | of part 1.2.1. | |
| 28 | Reference to DORA is | An anonymous respondent | We previously thought it would be useful to indicate in | Yes. |
| | premature. | considers it premature to | advance what the implications of DORA would be for the | |
| | | refer to DORA in the Policy | suitability requirements once DORA comes into force. Partly | |
| | | Rule now, as DORA is not yet | as a result of this consultation response, the AFM and DNB | |
| | | in force. | have come to the view that it is preferable not to refer to | |
| | | | DORA yet until the rules are in force. | |
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| | | EUROSYSTEEM | | | |
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| | | The A | FM and DNB have therefore decided to remove the | | |
| | | refere | ences to DORA from the Policy Rule and the explanatory | | |
| | | notes. | Knowledge of ICT risk management among | | |
| | | policy | makers for a group of enterprises is nevertheless | | |
| | | increa | singly essential. For that reason, risk control and | | |
| | | mitiga | ation in the field of ICT (and ICT outsourcing) are indeed | | |
| | | menti | oned as relevant subjects under knowledge of sound | | |
| | | and et | thical operational management. | | |
| 29 | EuSEF regulation. | In addition to the amendment to the suitability assessment for policymakers of a qualifying venture capital | | | |
| | | fund that was the subject of a previous consultation, as referred to in Article 3 opening words and (a) of the | | | |
| | | EuVECA Regulation, following the consultation the qualifying social entrepreneurship fund as referred to in | | | |
| | | Article 3 opening words and (a) of the EuSEF Regulation has also been added to the Policy Rule on Fitness. | | | |
| | | The policymakers of these funds are already assessed by the AFM on the basis of the EuSEF Regulation, but | | | |
| | | these assessments were erroneously omitted from the version of the Policy Rule on Fitness put out to | | | |
| | | consultation. The addition in the Policy Rule on Fitness makes clear that the AFM also assesses the suitability | | | |
| | | of policymakers of qualifying social entrepreneurship funds as referred to in Article 3 opening words and (a) | | | |
| | | of the EuSEF Regulation. Although the amendment was not put out to consultation, the requirement of having | | | |
| 1 | 1 | | | | |

