CESR geeft voorkeur aan self-regulation

CESR: voorkeur voor self-regulation van kredietraters

Dit rapport bediscussieert of er marktfalen kan ontstaan en, aangezien kredietraters in het algemeen niet onder toezicht vallen in Europa, er een soort van erkenning en/of toezicht nodig zou moeten zijn.

Meer informatie vind u op de website van CESR. Deze vindt u via de 'Zie ook' link.

Het originele bericht vindt u hieronder.

CESR: favours Self-Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies established around an Internationally agreed code for the time being.

CESR published today its advice (ref. CESR/05-139b) for the European Commission (Commission) on possible measures concerning credit rating agencies. This paper discusses the issue of how to deal with credit rating agencies in a regulatory context within Europe. In particular, the report identifies whether market failures might arise, and, as a result, whether there is a need for the introduction of some sort of recognition and/or regulation of rating agencies as these are generally not regulated in Europe today.

In its main conclusions, CESR proposes that on the development of appropriate rules of conduct, CESR advises the European Commission that, overall, the substance agreed by the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Code published in December 2004 provides the right answer to the issues raised by the Commission's mandate and analysed throughout the paper. It is felt that the IOSCO Code will improve the quality and integrity of the rating process and the transparency of CRAs' operations and reflects the message received from the responses to the consultation.

Therefore in relation to the aspect of the enforcement of the IOSCO Code and more specifically, in respect to the final question asked by the Commission's mandate: does CESR consider it appropriate that credit rating agencies should be registered in the EU?, CESR is proposing two possible ways of handling this issue, narrowing down the four alternatives originally considered: A clear majority of CESR members supports a 'wait and see' approach, where no recognition system is set up at present, and the effects of the IOSCO Code are given time to work, as IOSCO and its members have committed to monitoring the implementation of the code. Should self regulation fail to deliver, there might be a need for statutory regulation. Overall, this approach was shared by respondents to the consultation. A distinct minority of CESR members advocates an EU voluntary recognition system, along with a subsequent reporting on the compliance with the IOSCO code. 

The paper itself also analyses a potential set of rules of conduct that might apply to rating agencies and the provisions of the IOSCO code in relation to the aspects studied. In particular, the paper considers the various potential conflicts of interests that might arise as well as the fair presentation and methodologies of rating agencies, staff requirements and the relationship between issuers and credit rating agencies. In addition, an analysis of the use of ratings in private contracts and in European legislation is provided.

Amongst the various potential conflicts of interest which CESR discusses, a number arise in the context of the relationship between issuers and credit rating agencies. For example, ratings agencies are often remunerated by the issuers they rate and sometimes provide the issuer with ancillary services which some might consider could lead to a conflict of interest. 

In relation to methodologies for example, CESR discusses a number of transparency requirements that could be placed on rating agencies. For example, one might wish to require ratings agencies to disclose and explain the key elements underlying the rating and to provide an explanation of the assumptions on which the rating is based and the factors to which the rating of an issuer is most susceptible to change. 

A further key aspect of advice is the analysis on how credit rating agencies and issuers might effectively work within the requirements of the Market Abuse Directive, in relation to the handling of confidential and market sensitive information.

Finally, as regards the competitive direction of Credit Rating Agency activity in the EU, CESR is of the opinion that the impact of regulatory requirements is not clear and therefore it cannot conclude that any regulatory requirement would either increase or decrease the entry barriers to the rating industry. Thus, CESR does not recommend the use of regulatory requirements as a measure to reduce or remove entry barriers to the market for credit rating.